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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1)

Nature of the Case.

This is a contract case.
The contract contained a procedure for claiming additional payment and it contained an
arbitration clause. Respondent Debco Construction ("Debco") demanded arbitration.
The Idaho Transportation Department ("ITD") filed a declaratory judgment suit, alleging
that contractual (not statutory; not regulatory) conditions precedent to arbitration had not been
satisfied. ITD sought an order preventing Debco from pursuing arbitration until the alleged
contractual conditions precedent to arbitration were satisfied.
The case was dismissed below, the District Court finding that questions of procedural
arbitrability are for the arbitrators, not the courts.

2)

The Course of Proceedings Below.

On December 10, 2013, ITD filed its complaint soliciting declaratory and injunctive
relief. (R., Vol. I, p. 000005). ITD withdrew its request for injunctive relief prior to dismissal of
its complaint. (R., Vol. I, p. 000466). The declaratory action remained.
ITD prayed for "declaratory judgment ordering Debco to comply with the contract's
administrative claims process prior to pursuing arbitration." (Complaint for Declaratory
Judgment & Injunctive Relief, p. 10, Item #1; R., Vol. I, p. 000014).
Debco filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on January 17, 2014, asserting that the
procedural arbitrability question presented by ITD was for the arbitrators. (R., Vol. I, pp.
000154- 155).
1

On February 21, 2014, after briefing and argument, Judge Hippler granted the motion to
dismiss (R., Vol. I, p. 000468), and entered judgment against ITD " ... on all claims asserted
against Defendant in Plaintiffs complaint." (R., Vol. I, p. 000469).
ITD did not file a motion to amend its complaint.
The customary memorandum of costs was filed. (R., Vol. I, p. 0004 72). After hearing and
briefing, costs and fees were awarded to Debco. (R., Vol. I, p. 000516).

3)

A Concise Statement of Facts.

This is an appeal from the grant of an I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motion. For convenience, a
marked-up copy of the text of the Complaint, complete with page numbers assigned in the
Clerk's record, is attached as Appendix "A".
ITD filed its Complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on December 10,
2013. (R., Vol. I, p. 000005). ITD asserted that the pat1ies entered into a contract containing
both an administrative claims process and an arbitration clause. (Complaint, iJifl2-14; R., Vol. I,
p. 000008). ITD asserted that Debco failed to exhaust the contractual administrative claims
process prior to demanding arbitration (Complaint, i)35; R., Vol. I, p. 000012).
ITD alleged that it was " ... entitled to enforce contract provisions related to the
administrative claims process." (Complaint, i)37; R., Vol. I, p. 000012; emphasis added). On its
declat·atory count, ITD requested that the court "declare the appropriate interpretation of the

contract, and ... enforce Debco's obligation to exhaust the administrative claims process prior to
commencing arbitration" (Complaint, iJ42; R., Vol. I, p. 000013; emphasis added).

2

ITD further sought injunctive relief prohibiting Debco from pursuing the arbitration
" ... unless and until Debco completes the contractual administrative claims process." (Complaint,
,r,r45-46; R., Vol. I, p. 000013 -14; emphasis added).
On January 17, 2014, Debco filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to I.R.C.P.
12(b)(6).

(R.,

Vol.

I,

p.

000015).

Debco

posited that "[q]uestions

of procedural

arbitrability" ... such as whether conditions precedent to arbitrate have been met " ... are for the
arbitrators to decide." Storey Construction, Inc. v. Hanks, 148 Idaho 401, 412, 224 P.3d 468,
4 79 (2009). (R., Vol. I, p. 000016).
While it does not bear on the issue presented, it may offer perspective to observe that the
timing of Debco's arbitration demand was not without logic. As provided within the exhibits to
ITD's complaint, Debco's arbitration demand asserted (a) that an independent technical expert
jointly hired by the parties had concluded that Debco was without fault, (b) that the independent
expert had found that ITD had "deliberately" misrepresented matters provided in its report, and
(c) that an independent Dispute Review Board had found that Debco was entitled to payment;
still Debco was not paid and it was crippling the small company. (See generally, Complaint
Exhibit "F"; R., Vol. I, p. 000060-62). Debco had soundly briefed the propositions: (a) that the
arbitration clause did not contain an effective condition precedent to arbitration, (b) that contract
constructional rules strongly favored arbitrability of the dispute, and (c) that ITD's material
breach obviated compliance with any hypothetical condition precedent. (See, e.g., Debco's Brief
in Support of Motions to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment; R., Vol. I, p. 000297). But Debco
did not ask Judge Hippler to decide the merits of these propositions.
3

Debco simply asserted that ITD's questions of procedural arbitrability are quite clearly
for the arbitrators to decide, not the court. (Debco's Reply Brief on Motion to Dismiss; R., Vol. I,
p. 000428). ITD's complaint had focused solely on whether Debco had satisfied procedural
conditions precedent to arbitration. (See, Complaint,

,r,r 20, 35, 37, 42, 45, and 46; R., Vol. I, p.

000009-14).
Prior hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, ITD withdrew its claims for injunctive relief.
(R., Vol. I, p. 000466). As explained by ITD, the Arbitration Panel had declined to schedule an
arbitration hearing until the contract administrative claims process was complete, so there was no
need for an injunction. (See Appellant's Brief, p.3).
Following argument, Judge Hippler granted Debco's Motion to Dismiss. ITD had
acknowledged that only a contract question was presented and not a "statutory administrative
remedy process." (R., Vol. I, p. 000424). During argument, ITD had acknowledged that its
complaint presented only a question of whether conditions precedent to arbitration had been
satisfied. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 17, LL. 5-22). ITD had also acknowledged that if case law was properly
read so as to vest the arbitrators with authority to decide questions of procedural arbitrability, the
declaratory judgment act affords no basis to circumvent the rule. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 19, L. 13

p. 20,

L. 7).

ITD did not seek to amend its complaint to allege anything other than its contract-based
declaratory action, praying "for declaratory judgment ordering Debco to comply with the
contract's administrative claims process prior to pursuing arbitration" and "for declaratory

4

judgment ordering Debco to suspend the AAA arbitration unless and until Debco exhausts the
administrative claims process." (Complaint, Items #1 and #2 of Prayer; R., Vol. I, p. 000014).

5

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1)

Did ITD's Complaint state a cause of action under which relief could be granted

by the District Court?
2)

Did ITD move to amend its Complaint in any respect, or to plead a cause of

action under the Administrative Procedures Act?
3)

Should Debco be awarded cost and fees on appeal pursuant to LC. Section 12-

120(3), LC. Section 12-121, or LC. Section 12-117?

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ITD had already withdrawn its request for injunctive relief by the time this case was
dismissed.
The only declaratory relief sought in paragraph 42 of the Complaint was " ... to declare the
appropriate interpretation of the contract in ITD's favor, and enforce Debco's obligation to
exhaust the administrative claims process prior to commencing arbitration." (R., Vol. I, p.
000013). The prayer merely sought a "declaratory judgment ordering Debco to comply with the
contract's administrative claims process" and a "declaratory judgment ordering Debco to
suspend the AAA arbitration unless and until Debco exhausts the administrative claims process."
(Complaint, Items #1 and #2 of Prayer; R., Vol. I, p. 000014).
ITD's complaint patently presented a contractual question of procedural arbitrability.
Indeed, the proposition presented by ITD is nearly identical to that dispatched on rehearing in

Storey Construction, Inc. v. Hanks, 148 Idaho 401, 411-413, 224 P.3d 468, 478-480 (2009).
ITD did not ask to amend its complaint. ITD instead advised the District Court: (a) that
it presented a contractual issue, and was not relying on a "statutory administrative process"; (b)
that ITD had presented a question of whether contract conditions prior to arbitration had been
satisfied; and (c) that the declaratory judgment act added nothing to the analysis if Storey
Construction was properly read to vest the arbitrators with authority to decide questions of

procedural arbitrability.
Newly developed arguments as to the applicability of the Administrative Procedures Act
(a) were not pled below; (b) were disclaimed below; and (c) are substantively misplaced. The
7

legislature has not empowered ITD with administrative authority to decide its own contract
disputes, and the claims resolution provisions in ITD's contract are neither "Rules" as defined in
the Act nor found within IDAP A.

8

ARGUMENT
1)

The Standard of Review.
a)

Dismissal of the Complaint.

Dismissal of a complaint under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo. Taylor v.
McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 832, 242 P. 3d 642, 648 (2010).

After viewing all the facts and

inferences from the record in favor of the non-moving party, the Court will ask whether a claim
for relief has been stated. The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but
whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.

Id., (citing Losser v

Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672-73, 183 P.3d 758, 760-61 (2008)).

b)

Attorney Fees.

Whether a statute awarding attorney fees applies to a given set of facts is a question of
law.

Grease Spot, Inc. v. Harnes, 148 Idaho 582, 586, 226 P.3d 524, 528 (2010) (citing

Ransom v. Topaz Mktg., 143 Idaho 641,644, 152 P.3d 2, 5 (2006)).

2)

ITD's Contract Complaint did not State a Cause of Action Under Which
Relief Could be Granted by the District Court.
a)

What Cause of Action Was Pied?

ITD's Complaint, focused narrowly on questions of procedural arbitrability, and was
styled as one for "Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief." (R., Vol. I, p. 000005). ITD pled
the existence of a contract containing both an administrative claims process and an arbitration
clause. (Complaint, ,r,rll-20; R., Vol. I, p. 000007-10). ITD alleged that Debco had improperly

9

filed arbitration prior to completion of the contract administrative process (R., Vol. I, p. 00001011).
ITD asserted that it was " ... entitled to enforce the contract provisions pertaining to the
administrative claims process." (Complaint, 137; R., Vol. I, p. 000012).
Count One of the Complaint sought "Declaratory Judgment" and Count Two sought a
"Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction" (R., Vol. I, p. 000013). Except perhaps as to the
immediate effect of a restraining order, there was no practical difference between the requested
declaratory and injunctive remedies.
Under Count One, " .. .ITD request[ed] that this Court issue a Declaratory Judgment in
ITD's favor to declare the appropriate interpretation of the contract, and to enforce Debco's
obligation to exhaust the administrative claims process prior to commencing arbitration."
(Complaint, 142; R., Vol. I, p. 000014). The prayer of the Complaint sought " ... declaratory
judgment ordering Debco to comply with the contract's administrative claims process prior to
pursuing arbitration" (Complaint, Item # 1 of Prayer; R., Vol. I, p. 15), and " ... declaratory
judgment ordering Debco to suspend the AAA arbitration unless and until Debco exhausts the
administrative claims process." (Complaint, Item #2 of Prayer; R., Vol. I, p. 000015).
Under Count Two, ITD (seeking both a TRO and a Preliminary Injunction) requested that
the Court " .. .issue an injunction to enJom Debco and anyone acting on its behalf from
prosecuting an arbitration demand unless and until Debco completes the contractual
administrative claims process." (Complaint, 146; R., Vol. I, p. 000015). The prayer of the
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Complaint sought " ... an injunction to enjoin Debco from pursuing arbitration absent completion
of the administrative claims process." (Complaint, Item #4 of Prayer; R., Vol. I, p. 000015).
As a practical matter, the declaratory and injunctive counts were indistinguishable
ITD withdrew its request for injunctive relief prior to the hearing on Debco's motion to
dismiss ITD' s complaint. (R., Vol. I, p. 000466).
b)

Questions of Procedural Arbitrability are For the Arbitrators.

For five years now it has been settled law that questions of procedural arbitrability are for
the arbitrators. Storev Construction, Inc. v. Hanks, 148 Idaho 401, 411-413, 224 P.3d 468, 478480 (2009). The question presented now was squarely addressed then.
Mr. Storey had asserted that the Court (not the arbitrators) should decide whether a
contract administrative procedure was a condition precedent to arbitration and whether that
procedure had been satisfied. Storev Construction, supra at 411-412. The contract in question in

Storev Construction contained a provision requiring claims to first be submitted to an architect
for review prior to arbitration. Storev Construction, supra, at 411-412, n.7.

ITD's contract

provision is strikingly similar, contemplating that claims may be submitted to the engineer for
review. (Complaint, Exhibit "C"; R., Vol. I, pp. 000033-34).
The Storev Construction Comi dispatched the procedural issue in favor of arbitration,
addressing the subject as follows:

"Arbitrability is a question of law to be decided by the court. " Mason v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 197, 200, 177 P.3d 944, 947 (2007). However,
courts, including this Court, have limited the scope of the question of arbitrability. The
vast majority have held that issues of procedural arbitrability, such as whether
conditions precedent to an obligation to arbitrate have been met, are for the arbitrators
11

to decide. As the United States Supreme Court explained in Howsam v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 537 US. 79, 84-85, 123 S.Ct. 588, 592, 154 L.Ed2d 491, 497-98 (2002):
Thus " 'procedural' questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final
disposition" are presumptively not for the judge, but for an arbitrator, to decide.
John Wiley [& Sons, Inc. v. Livingston[, supra, [376 US. 543] at 557, 84 S.Ct.
909[, 918, 11 L.Ed2d 898, 909 (1964)] (holding that an arbitrator should decide
whether the first two steps of a grievance procedure were completed, where these
steps are prerequisites to arbitration). So, too, the presumption is that the
arbitrator should decide "allegation[s] of waiver, delay, or a like defense to
arbitrability. "Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital [v. Mercury Construction,
Corp.[, supra, [460 US. l] at 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927[, 941, 74 L.Ed.2d 765, 785
(1983)]. Indeed, the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000 (RUAA), seeking to
"incorporate the holdings of the vast majority ofstate courts and the law that has
developed under the [Federal Arbitration Act]," states that an "arbitrator shall
decide whether a condition precedent to arbitrability has been fulfilled" RUAA §
6(c), and comment 2, 7 UL.A. 12-13 (Supp.2002). And the comments add that "in
the absence of an agreement to the contrary, issues ofsubstantive arbitrability ...
are for a court to decide and issues ofprocedural arbitrability, i.e., whether
prerequisites such as time limits, notice, !aches, estoppel, and other conditions
precedent to an obligation to arbitrate have been met, are for the arbitrators to
decide. " Id., §6, comment 2, 7 UL.A., at 13 (emphasis added).
Although this Court has not addressed whether issues ofprocedural arbitrability,
such as a condition precedent, should be decided by the arbitrators or the court, having
the arbitrators decide it would be consistent with our precedents.
"This Court has recognized a strong public policy which favors arbitration.
Agreements to arbitrate are encouraged and given explicit recognition as effective means
to resolve disputed issues. "Mason v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 197,
201, 177 P.3d 944, 948 (2007) (citations omitted). In International Association of
Firefighters, Local No. 672 v. City o{Boise City, 136 Idaho 162, 168, 30 P.3d 940, 946
(2001), this Court wrote, "A court reviewing an arbitration clause will order arbitration
unless 'it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. 'Doubts are to be
'resolved in favor of coverage.' In Firefighters, we held that whether the particular
issue was arbitrable was to be determined by the arbitrators where the parties had
agreed to arbitrate grievances, which were defined as involving the interpretation or
application of their labor agreement, and "it cannot be said with 'positive assurance'
that the ... dispute does not 'concern' the 'application and interpretation' of [the labor
agreement]." 136 Idaho at 169, 30 P.3d at 947.
12

Whether the Trustee has complied with contract procedures that are conditions
precedent to the arbitration ofparticular issues is to be determined by the arbitrators.
Storey Construction, Inc. v. Hanks, 148 Idaho 401, 411-413, 224 P.3d 468, 478480 (2009) (italics added).

Quite clearly, ITD's assertion that conditions prior to arbitration had not been satisfied
was a question of procedural arbitrability - a question for the arbitrators. The District Court was
correct.

c)

At the Time the Complaint Was Dismissed, Nothing Remained but a
Question of Procedural Arbitrability.

At hearing, ITD advised the District Court that nothing remained of its complaint but a
question of procedural arbitrability:

THE COURT: You would agree that with respect to the Complaint itself and the
allegations, that there's no dispute, one, that there is an arbitration clause?
MR. LUKE: Correct.
THE COURT: Two, that the arbitration has been filed?
MR. LUKE: Correct.
THE COURT: Three, that there is another part of the contract by which you're
relying on for your Complaint, which is that there must be certain conditions
precedent, or there are certain conditions---and how well characterize those---but
there's certain conditions that you allege prior to arbitration that must be met,
namely, the review by the engineers?
MR. LUKE: Agreed.
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 17, L. 5-22).
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While disagreeing with the interpretation of Storey Construction, ITD also agreed that,
if Storey Construction makes it improper for the court to determine conditions precedent to
arbitration, the Declaratory Judgment Statute would give the Court no basis for an "end-run."
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 19, L. 13 - p. 20, L. 7).
In a carefully reasoned bench ruling, the District Court observed that " ... conditions
precedent to arbitration are matters for the arbiter and not for the district courts to decide.
Therefore, taking as true what plaintiff has alleged in the Complaint, nonetheless this court is
without proper authority to get involved in this dispute. The dispute is one properly to be decided
by the arbiters, and therefore the Motion to Dismiss is proper and I' 11 grant it." (Tr., Vol. I, p.
28, L. 20

p. 29, L. 6).

The District Court followed established precedent based on the terms of the complaint
and ITD's own admissions. The District Court was correct.

3)

ITD did not Move to Amend its Complaint in Any Respect, or to Plead a
Cause of Action Under the Administrative Procedure Act.

ITD spearheads its appeal with an Administrative Procedures Act case, Laughy v. Idaho

Transportation Department, 149 Idaho 867, 243 P.3d 1055 (2010). The case was not cited
below, nor was there any citation below to a controlling administrative statute or IDAPA rule. It
was not asse1ied below that the Administrative Procedures Act ("AP A") applied, and ITD did
not seek to amend its contract-based Complaint to assert a cause of action under the AP A.
Indeed, ITD represented to the District Court that the "administrative process" it relied on
was "a creature of contract, rather than of statutory specification." (R., Vol. I, p. 000424).
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Generally, issues not raised below may not be considered for the first time on appeal.
Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 322, 815 P.2d 1061, 1062 (1991) (referencing Kinsela v.
State, Dep't ofFinance, 117 Idaho 631, 634, 790 P.2d 1388, 1390 (1990)).

Respectfully, ITD's proposed application of the Administrative Procedures Act on appeal
is not crisply understood.
Debco recognizes that " ... when an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief
must be sought from the administrative body and this remedy must be exhausted before the
courts will review the dispute." Peterson v. City of Pocatello, 117 Idaho 234, 236, 786 P .2d
1136, 1138 (1990); (emphasis added); (citing Pounds v. Denison, 115 Idaho 382, 383, 766 P.2d
1262, 1264 (Ct.App. 1988)). Here, the complaint alleged that an administrative process was
provided by contract. No applicable administrative statute or regulation was pled or cited below;
indeed, ITD expressly disclaimed the applicability of any statutory administrative process. (R.,
Vol. I, p. 000424).
In the context of the Administrative Procedure Act ("AP A") the legislature must
empower the agency to "determine the particular issue" before a decision on that issue takes on
the status of an "order". Laughy v. ldaho Transportation Department, 149 Idaho 867,871,243
P.3d 1055, 1059 (2010). On appeal, ITD now asserts that (as with most all agencies) it has been
granted the statutory right to enter into contracts under LC. Section 40-309, and that therefore the
Legislature has empowered it to determine the particular issue of whether Debco is entitled to a
contract price adjustment. (Appellant's Brief, p. 11). But the legislative-derived right to contract
is not equivalent to a legislative empowerment of ITD to decide its own contract disputes in an
15

administrative process. Moreover, ITD's argument on appeal is directly contradicted by its
acknowledgement below, that the administrative process in question was not a creature of
statute. (R., Vol. I, p. 000424).
Undeterred, ITD asserts that the legislature has granted it authority to prescribe "rules and
regulations affecting state highway projects ... " as provided within LC. Section 40-312(1).
(Appellant's Brief, p. 12). ITD asserts that it adopted contract provisions pursuant to such
authority. The same statute grants ITD rule-making authority for utility relocation, advertising
structures and the like affecting highways. LC. Section 40-312(2)-(5).

ITD has indeed

implemented the authority of LC. Section 40-312 to adopt "Rules" related to such matters as
Utilities On State Highway Right of Way (IDAPA 39.03.43), Outdoor Advertising (IDAPA
39.03.60) and many others. (See generally IDAP A 39.03).
Those administrative regulations which are set out within IDAP A are truly "Rules"
within the definition of the AP A, for they were " ... promulgated in compliance with the
provisions of this chapter. .. " LC. Section 67-5201(19). Rules properly promulgated are
transmitted to the Department of Administration for publication in its bulletin, and if adopted, are
recorded and published within Idaho's administrative code. I.C. Section 67-5202 through 675204.
However, the contract prov1s10ns utilized within ITD's Specifications are not so
promulgated and are not contained within Idaho's administrative code, and are not "Rules" as
defined within the AP A. As admitted by ITD below, the administrative process in question is
merely a "creature of contract." (R., Vol. I, p. 000424).
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As pled within ITD's complaint, and as represented to the District Court, ITD's
specifications are just contract provisions which contain an arbitration clause.
In entering into its contract with Debco, the Idaho Transportation Department " .. .laid
aside its attributes as a sovereign, and bound itself substantially as one of its citizens does when
he enters into a contract. Its contracts are interpreted as the contracts of individuals ... " Grant
Construction Company v. Burns, 92 Idaho 408, 412-413, 443 P.2d 1005, 1009-1010 (1968),

(quoting Carr v. State ex rel. Du Coetlosquet, 127 Ind. 204, 26 N.E. 778, 779 (1891)).

The AP A is inapplicable. This is a contract case.

4)

The Fee Award was Proper.

Debco sought an award of fees under J.C. Section 12-120(3) noting that the Court
(overruling prior decisions) recently confirmed that J.C. Section 12-120(3) and J.C. Section 12121 do apply to the State of Idaho as a litigant. Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Department of
Administration, 155 Idaho 55, 67,305 P.3d 499, 511 (2013).

Further, in nearly identical circumstances, the Court granted attorney fees to a prevailing
defendant " ... to compensate ... for attorney time incurred in compelling the arbitration." The
Grease Spot, Inc. v. Harnes, 148 Idaho 582,586,226 P.3d 524, 528 (2010).

ITD suggests here, and suggested below, that its suit was for declaratory and injunctive
relief, and that an action to recover on a commercial transaction must be a suit to recover
[money! on a commercial transaction. Not so. In an extensive sense, a "recovery" may include

not just money, but " ... the restoration or vindication of a right existing in a person, by the fonnal
judgment or decree of a competent court ... or the obtaining by such judgment, of some
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right ... which had been taken or withheld ... " (Black's Law Dictionary, West Publishing
Company, 5th Ed., 1979).
Where, as here, declaratory and injunctive relief is sought under a commercial contract,
the Court has confirmed that attorney fees are awardable under I.C. Section 12-120(3).
Freiburger v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 141 Idaho 415, 423-424, 111 P.3d 100, 108-109 (2005).

In Freiburger, the Court expressly rejected an argument that fees should not be awarded
under I.C. Section 12-120(3) in a declaratory judgment action, and instead confirmed a District
Court award of attorney fees under I.C. Section 12-120(3) where, as here, the suit sought
declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce a covenant in a commercial contract. Freiburger,
supra at 141 Idaho 423-424.

"Thus, [w]here a party alleges the existence of a contractual

relationship of a type embraced by section 12-120(3) ... that claim triggers the application of the
statute." Id. (emphasis added).
The District Court reasoned as follows:
"Now looking at 12-120(3), it's quite clear to the court that this Court does have
the authority to award attorney fees against the state in a case, based on 12-120(3) ...
So then the question is does this case -is it one of a commercial transaction as
envisioned under 12-120(3). And I think that this was an action brought to enforce the
contractual rights of the parties under a contract, to declare those rights and to enforce
them ...
I think that the Frieburger case indicates that attorney's fees can be awarded in
cases where equitable relief is sought rather than monetary relief and I think the Grease
Spot case, clearly the implication of the Grease Spot case to the court is that a case in a
commercial dispute to compel arbitration can support an award for attorney's fees. And
it only follows that the reverse of that must be true; that is, that a dispute defended in an
effort-defending an effort or defending against an effort to limit the arbitration rights of
a party under a contract, likewise can result in and support an arbitration of attorney
fees ...
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So I think that 12-123 provides a basis for this type of action to award attorney
fees. I do believe that what is at stake here, the gravamen of this matter, was a
commercial transaction, and seeking the party's rights under a commercial transaction."
(Amended Tr., Vol. I, p. 25, L. I through p. 26, L. 12; italics added.)
Debco respectfully submits that fees below would have been appropriate under LC.
Section 12-117 as well. Applicable authority there for is set out below.
5)

Debco Should be Awarded Fees and Costs On Appeal.
a)

Fees Under I.C. Section 12-120(3).

For the forgoing reasons, Debco respectfully requests fees on appeal pursuant to LC.
Section 12-120(3).
b)

Fees Under I.C. Section 12-117.

Debco also respectfully also requests fees on appeal under LC. Section 12-117. A fee
award is mandatory under LC. Section 12-117 where the state agency did not act with a
reasonable basis in law. Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC v. Latah County, 144 Idaho 806, 812, 172
P.3d 1081, 1087 (2007); (overruled on other grounds by City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho
906, 908, 277 P.3d 353, 355 (2012)). Lack of a reasonable basis in law has been found, for
example, where the public agency has disregarded long established precedent. See, Reardon v.
City ofBurley, 140 Idaho 115, 120, 90 P.3d 340, 345 (2004); (overruled on other grounds by
City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906,908,277 P.3d 353,355 (2012)).

In this case, ITD not only disregarded the established precedent of the Storey
Construction case, but has continued to do so long after the authority was revealed. All this was
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done in the face of Debco' s complaint that ITD' s nonpayment of funds once acknowledged due
was financially "breaking" the company.
I.C. Section 12-117 provides a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified
financial burdens attempting to correct mistakes that agencies should never have made. Ralph
Naylor Farms, supra at 144 Idaho 806. This objective is aptly served by a fee award in this
dispute.

c)

Fees Under J.C. Section 12-121.

Finally, and with earnest respect for opposing counsel, but with grave concern for actions
urged by those in authority at ITD, Debco requests fees on appeal under I.C. Section 12-121.
See, Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Department ofAdministration, 155 Idaho 55, 67, 305

P.3d 499,511 (2013).
Fees are requested in that this appeal was brought unreasonably and without foundation.
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). Debco's respectful concern goes well beyond the disregard of precedent
related to procedural arbitrability questions.
Specifically, ITD admitted to the District Court that the administrative claims process in
question was a "creature of contract rather than of statutory specification." (R., Vol. I, p.
000424). While ITD admitted below that it was "incorrect" to "suggest ITD is relying on a
statutory administrative remedy process" (R., Vol. I, p. 000424), ITD now rests its appeal on the
argument that a statutory administrative remedy exists; specifically: (a) that the statutory
empowerment of the right to contract, is equivalent to statutory empowerment of the right to
decide contract disputes under a legislatively authorized administrative process; and (b), that the
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contractual administrative claims provisions enjoy the same status as a properly promulgated
IDAP A "Rules". (Appellant's Brief, pp. 11-12). ITD follows with an attempt to distinguish
Storey Construction with the same argument; one that it had expressly disavowed below, to-wit:

"as explained above, this is not merely a contractual condition precedent as that term is explained
in Storey Construction." ( Appellant's Brief, p. 15, emphasis added).
Respectfully, such actions by a governmental agency are not fair to the District Court, not
fair to this Court, and most importantly, are fundamentally unfair to those such as Debco, who
have no choice but to hope for fair play by governmental Departments such as ITD.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the decision of the District Court, and award fees and costs on
appeal to Respondent Debco.
DATED this 1I th day of September, 2014.
BLEWETT MUSHLITZ, LLP
By _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _- + - - - - - - - Ron T. Blewett, ISB No. 2963,
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
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Case No.

cv oc

1321919

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

---------------)
COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF Idaho Transportation Department (hereafter "ITD"),
pursuant to Idaho Code § 7-902 and § 10-1201 et seq, and brings this cause of action for
declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendant Ascorp, Inc. d/b/a Debco Construction
(hereafter "Debco"). ITD hereby seeks to stay any arbitration unless and until Debco completes
a contractually-required exhaustion of an administrative claims process.

In support of this

action, ITD complains and alleges as follows:
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I. PARTIES
1.

Plaintiff ITD is a State of Idaho governmental entity. ITD's obligations include

overseeing and maintaining the state highway system.

ITD also administers construction

contracts for certain local road projects throughout Idaho.
2.

Defendant Debco is a corporation registered in Idaho as Ascorp, Inc. Defendant

operates under the name Debco or Debco Construction. Debco' s registered agent and president
is Lonnie E. Simpson. Debco does business in the State ofldaho.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
3. ·

As explained further below, the Parties' contract specifies that disputes are to be

heard in Boise, Idaho (the assumption is that these disputes would be addressed via arbitration,
which would not proceed until after the exhaustion of an administrative claims process).
4.

As also explained in greater detail below, Defendant Debco has filed a demand

for arbitration and, pursuant to the Parties' contract, has requested that such be heard in Boise,
Idaho.
5.

Idaho's Uniform Arbitration Act is found in Chapter 9 of Title 7, Idaho Code.

Therein, section 7-918 provides as follows:
Venue. An initial application shall be made to the court of the
county in which the agreement provides the arbitration hearing
shall be held or, if the hearing has been held, in the county in
which it was held. . ..

r.c. § 7-918.
6.

As an Idaho corporation doing business in Idaho, Debco is subject to this Court's

jurisdiction.
7.

Venue is appropriate in Ada County pursuant to (i) the Parties' contract, (ii)

Debco's demand for arbitration, and (iii) Idaho Code§ 7-918.
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III. APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
8.

Idaho Code§ 10-1201 provides as follows:
Declaratory judgments authorized - Form and effect. Courts
of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to
declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not
further relief is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall
be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or
decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative or
negative in form and effect, and such declarations shall have the
force and effect of a final judgment or decree.

LC. § 10-1201.
9.

Idaho Code§ 10-1203 provides as follows:
Construction of contracts. -- A contract may be construed either
before or after there has been a breach thereof.

LC.§ 10-1203.
10.

Idaho Code§ 7-902(b) provides as follows:
(b) On application, the court may stay an arbitration proceeding
commenced or threatened on a showing that there is no agreement
to arbitrate. Such an issue, when in substantial and bona fide
dispute, shall be forthwith and. summarily tried and the stay
ordered if found for the moving party.

Idaho Code§ 7-902 (entitled "Proceedings to compel or stay arbitration").

IV. PARTIES' CONTRACT AND DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PROVISIONS
1I.

In May of 2010, Deb co submitted a proposal to ITD whereby Debco would

reconstruct a portion of Washington Street in the City of Twin . Falls, Idaho (hereafter
"Washington Street project"). Said proposal by Debco was in the form of a unit price bid in the
amount of $6,531,483.40. A true and correct copy of the pricing proposal is attached as Exhibit
A. The Washington Street project was to be a local road project administered by ITD.
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12.

On or about June 3, 2010, ITD and Debco entered into a contract for the

Washington Street project. The contract is identified as ITD Contract No. 7418. Lonnie E.
Simpson signed the contract on behalf of Debco. The contract incorporated Debco's unit price
bid in the amount of $6,531,483.40. A true and correct copy of pages CA-1 and CA-2 are
attached as Exhibit B (CA-2 is the signature page; CA-1 is the preceding page entitled
"CONTRACT AGREEMENT").
13.

The parties' contract also incorporates the 2004 Standard Specifications for

Highway Construction.

The Standard Specifications booklet is a sizeable document which

addresses numerous aspects of contracting and construction.
14.

Of relevance for ITD's Complaint is Standard Specification 105.17. A true and

correct copy of this provision is attached as Exhibit C. As can be seen, the provision is titled
"Claims for Adjustment and Disputes," and it contains the following subheadings:
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROVISIONS (page 33);
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (page 33);
GENERAL (page 38);
AUDITS (page 38); and
BINDING ARBITRATION (page 40).
15.

Updates to the Standard Specifications are provided in a compilation of

Supplemental Specifications, which are also incorporated into the Parties' contract. True and
correct copies of the Supplemental Specifications Index and the specific, supplemented changes
to Standard Specification 105.17 are attached as Exhibit D (the Supplemental Specifications are
included to provide the complete contractual provision; the specific, supplemented changes to
105.17 haye limited significance to ITD's present Complaint).
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16.

Standard Specification 105.17 provides ITD with the opportunity to r¢solve

claims via an administrative claims process prior to being subjected to a binding arbitration
proceeding,
17.

Under this provision, the administrative claim process begins with an ITD

Resident Engineer who has 90 days after receipt of a documented claim to analyze and make a
decision. See ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS entry on pages 33-37 of Exhibit C. Many claims
are resolved at the Resident Engineer level.

If a contractor is not satisfied, however, it may appeal a Resident Engineer's

18.

decision to ITD's Chief Engineer. See ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS entry at pages 37-38
(Exhibit C), which requires a decision from the Chief Engineer within 90 days after the Chief
Engineer receives a documented claim appeal. Again, many claims are resolved at the Chief
Engineer level.
19.

If a contractor remains unsatisfied, however, it can then demand arbitration:
If the Contractor is to make a demand for arbitration, it must be
made within 120 days of the date of the Chief Engineer's decision,
otherwise the Chief Engineer's decision shall be final and
conclusive.

See BINDING ARBITRATION entry at page 40 (Exhibit C, last paragraph).
20.

Arbitration is only available, however, after completion of the preceding

administrative cl_aims process:
The Contractor shall exhaust the Administrative Process for
resolution, unless the Contractor and the Department agree that
claims that have not been resolved through the Administrative
Process provided in this section shall be resolved through binding
arbitration. The Contractor and the Department may agree on an
arbitration process, or, if the Contractor and the Department cannot
agree, arbitration shall be administered through the American
Arbitration Association (AAA) using the following arbitration
methods:
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[References Expedited or Standard AAA provisions depending on
the claim amount.]
The Department and Contractor agree that any arbitration hearing
shall be conducted in Boise, Idaho.
The Contractor and the Department agree to be bound by the
decision of the binding arbitration, and the judgment rendered by
the arbitrator(s). The decision of the arbitrator(s) and the specific
basis for the decision shall be in writing. The arbitrator(s) shall
use the contract as a basis for the decision.
Unless the Contractor and the Department agree, all unresolved
claims and disputes which arise from the contract, must be brought
in a single arbitration hearing.
See BINDING ARBITRATION entry on page 40 (Exhibit C).
21.

Separate from the administrative claims process, the Standard Specifications

allow the Parties to retain a technical expert to make non-binding recommendations. Further, the
contract allows the Parties to potentially avoid a formal claim via a Dispute Resolution Board.
The Dispute Resolution Board is also specified as being a non-binding process.

V. DEBCO FILED AN ARBITRATION DEMAND
ONE DAY AFTER SUBMITTING ITS CLAIM
22.

During the Washington Street project and thereafter, ITD has agreed to contract

adjustments that increased the amount actually paid to Debco to approximately $8.4 million.
23.

Prior to October 28, 2013, the Parties were engaged in non-binding efforts to

address Deb co' s additional payment adjustment requests (over and above the approximately $1.9
million that had already been provided in excess of Debco's unit price bid). These efforts
included both a technical expert recommendation and an initial hearing before a Dispute
Resolution Board. In accordance with the contract, ITD participated in good faith, but never
agreed that either effort was anything but non-binding.
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24.

Debco submitted its initial claim to ITD on October 28, 2013. A true and correct

copy of the October 28, 201~ submission is attached as Exhibit E. This submission commenced
the administrative claims review process.
25.

The very next day, October 29, 2013, Debco submitted a demand for arbitration to

the American Arbitration Association (hereafter "AAA"). A true and correct copy of Debco's
October 29, 2013 arbitration demand is attached as Exhibit F (please note: this is a large
document with multiple appendices and its own exhibits).
26.

Debco's arbitration demand acknowledges that Debco has not exhausted the

administrative claims process.
27.

ITD has not agreed to waive the administrative claims process; rather, ITD

intends to proceed with the claims analysis as specified in the Parties' contract.

VI. AAA IS PROCEEDING WITH ADMINISTRATION
OF THE ARBITRATION
28.

ITD has objected to Debco's arbitration dem~d because Debco failed to exhaust

the administrative claims process, and because ITD has not been given the opportunity to address
and/or resolve claims prior to arbitration commencing (these are not necessarily the sole reasons
for ITD's objection).
29.

To avoid any waiver pursuant to the AAA arbitration rules, ITD has formally

made such objections to AAA.

A true and correct copy of ITD's arbitration answer and

accompanying motion is attached as Exhibit G (requesting that arbitration be held in abeyance
unless and until Debco completes the administrative clail).ls review process).
30.

Despite ITD's objection, AAA has stated: "Absent mutual agreement or court

order, the Association shall proceed with the administration of this matter."

See AAA's

November 22, 2013 e-mail attached as Exhibit H.
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31.

AAA has further indicated that it intends to assemble an arbitration panel, which

means that ITD will immediately incur substantial costs (most potential panel members charge
$280-$400 per hour, meaning a three-person panel would quickly incur thousands of dollars in
expense). In an effort to avoid such expense, ITD will separately forward this Complaint to
AAA with an additional request that AAA delay further action until this Court has ruled.
32.

Debco has opposed ITD's request to hold arbitration in abeyance. See e-mail

from Debco's attorney attached as Exhibit I.
33.

Debco has further submitted a motion to AAA asking that an arbitration hearing

be promptly scheduled. See Debco's December 2, 2013 motion attached as Exhibit J.
34.

Debco's and AAA's respective actions demonstrate that ITD will be engaged in

full blown arbitration in the very near future absent this Court's intervention.
VII. ARBITRATION SHOULD BE STAYED

35.

Debco has failed to exhaust the administrative claims process prior to demanding

arbitration.
36.

ITD has been precluded from addressing and/or resolving formal claims prior to

commencement of arbitration.

37.

ITD is entitled to ~JID~tJ;,xaYisiom pertaining to the administrative

claims process. This is important for the present dispute, as well as for all other contract disputes
that ITD might face in the future.
38.

Continuing with the arbitration prior to exhaustion of the administrative claims

process would be inefficient and cause undue waste of public funds and resources.
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39.

Continuing with the arbitration prior to exhaustion would allow Debco to benefit

from certain aspects of the contract that it likes (binding arbitration) while ignoring provisions
that it finds inconvenient (claims process).
40.

An arbitration stay would comply with the Parties' contract. Hence no harm

would be caused to Debco because full blown arbitration would be available at the appropriate
time.

VIII. COUNT ONE
(Declaratory Judgment)
41.

ITD here by incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 40 of this Complaint, as though

fully set forth herein.
42.

Pursuant to I.R.C.P Rule 57 and Idaho Code § 10-1201 et seq, ITD requests that

this Court issue a Declaratory Judgment in ITD's favor t o · d ~ ~ ~ intei;pretatmn

~llmW!, and to enforce Debco's obligation to exhaust the .administnJ.ti\Te claims process
pri9r to commencing arbitration.
43.

Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 10-1210, ITD requests that its reasonable costs incurred

in bringing this Complaint be awarded to ITD.

IX. COUNT TWO
(Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction)
44.

ITD hereby incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 43 of this Complaint, as though

fully set forth herein.
45.

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 65 and Idaho Code§ 7-902, ITD requests that this Court

promptly issue a temporary restraining order to enjoin Debco and anyone acting on its behalf
from prosecutirig its arbitration demand unless ·EW<l• until .Debco. complete$ ·the• ~
administrative claims process.
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46.

Pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 65 and Idaho Code§ 7-902, ITD requests that this Court

subsequently issue an injunction to enjoin Debco and anyone acting on its behalf from
prosectiting its arbitration demand unless and until Debco completes the contra~tual
administrative claims process.
47.

ITD respectfully requests a prompt hearing to address its request for a temporary

restraining order and/or an injunction.

X. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
W?EREFORE, PlaintiffITD prays for judgment against Defendant Debco as follows:
1. .

For a declaratory judgment ordering Debco to comply with the contract's

administrative claims process prior to pursuing arbitration.
2.

For a declaratory judgment ordering Debco to suspend the AAA arbitration unless

and until Debco exhausts the administrative claims process.
3.

For a temporary restraining order to enjoin Debco from pursuing arbitration

absent completion of the administrative claims process.
4.

For an injunction to enjoin Debco from pursuing arbitration absent completion of

the administrative claims process.
5.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems appropriate and proper.

DATED this JQ_ day of December, 2013.

Deputy Attorney General
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